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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

196S ]

earlier judgment was rendered by a Mexican court," 3 nevertheless
distinguished this case from Statter. While the litigant in Statter
could directly attack the first judgment, the plaintiff here had
already tried and failed to vacate the Mexican decree. Thus, his
only remedy was collateral attack in New York. Furthermore, the
Court noted that since Mexico would have permitted a collateral
attack on the decree our courts should permit such an attack.
Judge Burke, dissenting,114 agreed with the majority in principle but thought that the Mexican lawyer's affidavit, submitted to
show that collateral attack was possible in Mexico, was too flimsy
to allow the Court to take judicial notice of that fact.
Since Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel I-" recognized the validity of the
bilateral Mexican divorce, the problem has arisen as to when such
a decree could be attacked. In determining what effect a foreign
judgment will have here,"', resort usually is made to the law of
res judicata in the foreign forum. In fact, New York now appears
to compare the decree of Mexico with that of a sister state and
applies the same rules as to res judicata. 17 Thus, for the purpose
of collateral attack of a Mexican decree, it need only be established
that the decree could be collaterally attacked there. From the
Court's treatment of the Statter case, the fact that Mexico does or
does not allow direct attack does not appear to be operative, so long
as collateral attack is permitted. The Court's basic position appears
to be that, "[g]enerally, there is no reason to give more conclusive
effect to a foreign judgment than it would be accorded by the
courts of the jurisdiction that rendered it." 118
ARTICLE 51-

Civil Contempt:

ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND
GENERALLY

ORDERS

Defendant may immediately allege ill-health or
inability to pay.

In In re Hildreth,"9 the appellate division, first department,
held that on application to punish for civil contempt, it is within
"3'Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.Zd 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86 (1965).
11420

"i

N.Y2d at 886, 230 N.E.2d at 642, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 886.

16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).

116 Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel it the United

States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rsv. 44, 63 (1962).
117 Both the majority and the dissents cited, with approval, Magowan v.
Magowan, 19 N.Y.2d 296, 226 N.E.2d 304, 279 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1967), which
held that a party could collaterally attack a sister state's decree only if the
sister state would allow it.
"'sSchoenbrod v. Siegler, 20 N.Y.2d 403, 409, 230 N.E2d 638, 641, 283
N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (1967).
12928 App. Div. 2d 290, 284 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1st Dep't 1967).
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the court's discretion, irrespective of post imprisonment relief, to
consider the defendant's alleged ill-health or inability to pay as a
justifiable excuse for not complying with the court order.
While the public policy of this state is vigorously opposed to
imprisonment for debt, 20° CPLR 5105 expressly confers upon a
court two instances in which contempt may be imposed for failure
to pay a directed sum of money.12' This power to cite for civil
contempt, however, is one of discretion which a party cannot
compel the court to exercise.122
In a controversial decision, Schohl v. Phillips,123 the appellate

division, first department, limited the court's discretion when a
post conviction remedy was available. Since Section 775 of the
Judiciary Law allows release from imprisonment when there is a
showing of ill health or inability to pay, the court considered this
the exclusive remedy of the defendant.
Realizing, however, that Schmohl was at variance with the
policy favoring elimination of unnecessary motions and procedural
steps wherever possible, subsequent events have attempted to limit
it in effect. Section 84 of the Surrogate's Court Act has rendered
the rule inapplicable in the Surrogate's Court.1 4 Similarly, it has
been held at special term that the rule should no longer
be consid125
ered binding in supreme court contempt proceedings.
Consequently, upon considering these challenges, the appellate
division, first; department, in In re Hildreth, has concluded that
"Schmohl v. Phillips . . . should not be followed insofar as it may
be authority for limiting the proper exercise of the discretionary
powers of a court in determining an application for a civil contempt adjudication."

126

120See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 21; cf. Burns v. Newman, 274 App.
Div. 301, 83 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1st Dep't 1948).
-21 CPLR 5105 provides that a court can punish by civil contempt where
a defendant refuses or willfully neglects to pay money directed to be paid
by him pursuant to a judgment or order which "(1) requires the payment
of money into court or to an officer of, or receiver appointed by, the court,
except where the money is due upon an express or implied contract or as
damages for the non-performance of a contract; or (2) requires a trustee
or a person acting in a fiduciary relationship to pay a sum of money for
a willful default or dereliction of his duty."
1222 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, Nxv YORK CIVIL PRAcrIcE 115104.08
(1967). See Nelson v. Hirsch, 264 N.Y. 316, 190 N.E. 653 (1934). There
are situations, however, where there is little room for court discretion.
See People ex rel. McGoldrick v. Douglas, 286 App. Div. 807, 141 N.Y.S.2d
353 (1st Dep't 1955) (mem.); Victor v. Turetz, 266 App. Div. 311, 42
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1st Dep't 1943).
123 138 App. Div. 279, 122 N.Y.S. 974 (1st Dep't 1910).
124See
In re Lent, 159 Misc. 411, 287 N.Y.S. 848 (Surr. Ct. Kings
County 1936).
125In re Chassman, 1 Misc. 2d 766, 147 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955). See Harris Investing Corp. v. Sil-Gold Corp., 38 Misc. 2d
549, 552, 237 N.Y.S.2d 210, 215 (Sup. Ct Queens County 1962).
12628 App. Div. 2d 290, 294, 284 N.Y.S2d 755, 759-60 (1st Dep't 1967).

